While it is recognized that the family is a risk-sharing institution, little is known about the quantitative effects of this source of insurance on savings and labor supply. In this paper, we present a model where workers (females and males) are subject to idiosyncratic employment risk and where capital markets are incomplete. A household is formed by a female and a male, who decide on consumption, savings and labor supplies. In a calibrated version of our model we find that intra-household risk sharing has its largest impact among wealth-poor households.
Introduction
There is a vast literature studying workers' precautionary responses to employment risk under incomplete asset markets. Understanding these responses is important for assessing both the aggregate implications of this type of risk and public insurance policies. For instance, recent empirical evidence on patterns of insurance against employment risk has shed light on how some sources of insurance are crowded out by public insurance. More specifically, Cullen and Gruber (2000) and Engen and Gruber (2001) use a panel of U.S. households to estimate the extent to which two sources of insurance -the accumulation of financial assets and spousal labor supply-respond to changes in the generosity of public unemployment insurance (UI). They find significant crowding out effects on both, a finding that is of paramount importance for public policy evaluation. 1 The workhorse model of idiosyncratic risk under incomplete markets, the Aiyagari-Huggett setup, assumes, however, the bachelor household formulation, where a single breadwinner partially insures against employment risk by accumulating precautionary wealth when working. 2 This model is thus silent about risk sharing within the household, an insurance arrangement recently emphasized in the empirical literature (see, e.g., Blundell et al. 2008 and Shore 2010) .
In this paper we introduce within-household risk sharing into the Aiyagari-Huggett model and assess the extent and effects of spousal labor supply as insurance against unemployment shocks.
In our model economy, households are made up by two workers who pool risks and make decisions on individual consumptions, labor supplies and joint savings. Risk sharing within the two-person household is assumed to be efficient. There is a firms sector producing a homogeneous good with capital and labor services. Finally, there is a government collecting labor income taxes and paying UI benefits to unemployed workers.
To answer our question on the insurance role of spousal labor supply, we use the model just outlined to conduct a number of simulations. We first focus on wealth accumulation and compute the elasticity of the average household's assets-to-income ratio with respect to the generosity of UI. This elasticity provides us with a measure of both the precautionary saving motive and the crowding-out effect of UI on household savings, a measure that can be compared to recent empirical estimates. Then, we compute the added worker effect, namely, the response of wives' labor supply to husbands' unemployment spells, and the extent to which it is crowded out by UI. We assess both the change in hours of work by females brought about by an unemployment spell of their husbands, as well as the fraction of lost family income made up by this change in hours worked.
Next, we look at the role of within-household risk sharing in shaping consumption losses upon an 1 See, e.g., Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) and Chetty and Saez (2010) unemployment spell, a question that has also received attention in the empirical literature. All these effects of within-household risk sharing on spousal labor supply and consumption losses are computed for households with different levels of wealth. Since risk sharing has its largest impact among low-wealth households, special attention is devoted to the group of households with asset holdings below two months of average income. This is the group that Zeldes (1989) termed as liquidity-constrained households, and that represented almost 20% of all U.S. households in 2001.
Finally, and in order to put our findings in perspective, we compare the results of our simulations with those obtained in the workhorse model with bachelor households.
Our main findings show that within-household risk sharing has sizable effects. First, our twoperson household model generates less precautionary savings than the bachelor model, and comes closer to replicating empirical estimates of the elasticity of the average household's assets-toincome ratio with respect to UI. Engen and Gruber (2001) estimate this elasticity to be −0.28.
When calibrated to match key average values for the US economy, our two-person household model yields a value for this elasticity equal to −0.39, while the bachelor household model yields −0.70. This finding suggests that abstracting from risk sharing at the level of the household introduces an important bias in this elasticity. Second, we find that spousal labor supply is a significant source of insurance for wealth-poor households, while it is not for the wealth-rich. For instance, among liquidity-constrained households average hours worked by wives of unemployed husbands are 8.6% higher than those worked by wives of employed husbands. This response in wives' hours makes up on average 9.6% of lost family income. Third, the implications of family insurance for consumption losses upon unemployment are also sizable, especially for low-wealth households. We find that the average liquidity-constrained male lacking insurance from the family (bachelor household) suffers a drop in consumption of 30% upon a job loss, while the same male suffers a drop of only 8% when given access to family insurance (two-person household). When we compute the fraction of household income loss that transmits to household consumption loss for liquidity-constrained households, we find 35% under no family insurance, and 17% with family insurance.
We include two applications and one extension of our model. First, we compute the value of intrahousehold risk sharing. As suggested by our results above, this value is higher for individuals in low-wealth households. For example, the value of family insurance to an unemployed individual with an employed spouse and no assets represents more than 5% of per period consumption of a similar individual with no family insurance. This value decreases with the level of wealth.
Second, we study the consequences of family insurance for optimal UI and find that it is one of its key determinants. We compute optimal UI for households with different wealth levels with and without intra-household risk sharing, and find that family insurance creates a wedge in optimal replacement rates that is decreasing in the level of wealth. For instance, the optimal replacement rate for the average two-person household with no assets is 15%, while this rate is 60% for a similar household lacking family insurance. This wedge closes at wealth levels equal to six months of average income. As an extension, we introduce marital shocks in our benchmark model so that married and single households co-exist. Within this framework we study the robustness of our results on intra-household risk sharing, the implications of marital risk on households' savings, and compute consumption losses upon employment and/or marital shocks.
The literature on uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk with the bachelor household formulation is too large to summarize here. A recent example is the paper by Low et al. (2008) , where individuals (they focus only on males) are subject to a rich array of idiosyncratic shocks differing in their available insurance opportunities. Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) is one of the first papers in economics to study the role of the family as provider of insurance. They focus on longevity risk and
show that within-household risk sharing closes much of the utility gap between no annuities and The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environment, defines the steady-state equilibrium, and presents some properties of decision rules for two-person households. The model economy is parameterized and calibrated, and preliminary results on the role played by within-household risk sharing are shown. Section 3 contains results on the extent and effects of insurance from the family. The effects of changes in UI on savings, spousal labor supply and consumption losses upon unemployment are assessed. Section 4 presents some extensions and applications, and Section 5 concludes.
The Economic Environment
Consumers The economy is populated by a continuum of measure two of infinitely-lived consumers. Half of this population is referred to as females (f ), and the other half as males (m).
They supply time to work in the firms sector and face idiosyncratic risk in the form of employment shocks. Employment shocks, s, take on values in S ≡ {0, 1} and follow a Markov chain with transition matrix Π i , for i = f, m. Thus, π i s |s is the probability for an agent of gender i to receive employment shock s tomorrow conditional on employment shock s today. These probabilities satisfy s π i s |s = 1, π i s |s > 0, and π i 1|1 ≥ π i 1|0 for i = f, m. The long-run probabilities of the two employment shocks in S are denoted by q i 0 and q i 1 . As explained further below, we also allow for employment shocks to be correlated across spouses in the two-person household model. There are no others shocks in the economy.
Capital markets are incomplete. Households can save in a non-state-contingent asset, a, that pays the risk-free interest rate r. There is a borrowing constraint represented by a ≥ a.
Lifetime preferences for an agent of gender i over stochastic consumption and leisure streams are
where c t denotes consumption and l t is leisure. We make the following assumptions on U i : A1) 
Firms The aggregate good is produced by competitive firms with neoclassical production function
, where K is the aggregate stock of capital and L is aggregate labor. Capital depreciates at rate δ > 0. Aggregate labor is defined as L ≡ λL m + (1 − λ)L f , where 0 < λ < 1 defines the productivity of women relative to men. Given r and gross wage rates, w f and w m , the firm's first-order conditions are:
Public Unemployment Insurance (UI) A worker of gender i hit by the unemployment shock, s i = 0 , receives a gender-neutral replacement rate, b, of gender-i workers' average earnings, w i L i .
UI is financed on a period-by-period basis by taxing labor income at flat rate τ .
The Bachelor versus the Two-person Household Model
We consider two different risk-sharing arrangements, each of them defining in turn a different type of household. We start out by presenting the problem of the bachelor household. This is the definition of the household that has dominated not only the literature on precautionary savings, but also most of the macroeconomic literature. A single breadwinner chooses consumption, leisure and asset holdings in order to maximize his/her own lifetime utility. In most studies adopting this framework, the income process is estimated using data on males. The second type of household we study is a dynamic version of the two-person household model pioneered by Chiappori (1988) .
A household is formed by two individuals who decide on individual consumptions, labor supplies and savings. In order to understand the consequences of intra-household risk sharing we compare the allocations generated by these two household arrangements.
Bachelor Households A household formed by a single agent of gender i solves
where π i s |s are the elements of Π i and h denotes hours worked. UI income received when unemployed is the replacement rate, b, times average labor earnings of gender-i workers, e i ≡ w i L i .
A version of this model, where there is a measure one of same-gender workers, is the workhorse model in the literature of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, precautionary savings and labor supply. 3 By construction, the bachelor household does not engage in insurance activities with other workers beyond public unemployment insurance (UI). Own savings and UI are the only sources of insurance available to this type of household. The maximization problem of a two-person household with female's Pareto weight µ is,
Two-person Households
where π s |s are the elements of Π, and h f and h m denote hours worked by the female and the male, respectively; e i denotes gender-i workers' average labor earnings. It is important to note that our assumption of egoistical preferences is not crucial. Actually, Browning et al. (2006) show that under caring preferences of the form
where 0 < ν i ≤ 1, is agent i's caring parameter, the utility function of the household can be written down as for the case of egotistical preferences, after a re-definition of Pareto weights.
We now present the first-order conditions to the maximization problem (8)- (10) . Risk sharing within the household implies that the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption equals relative
Pareto weights, and is thus independent of the realized vector of employment shocks. That is, (c) Decision rules for consumption are increasing in the own and the spouse's employment
(d) Decision rules for leisure are increasing in the spouse's employment shock:
(e) If β(1 + r) ≤ 1, then for all a ∈ [a, a], a (s f = 0, s m = 0, a; µ) ≤ a (with strict inequality if a < a < a and β(1 + r) < 1).
We can prove some results on the asymptotic properties of the consumption program, savings and labor supply of a household with Pareto weight µ, for different values of wages, w, and of the interest rate, r. We extend results by Marcet et al. (2007) for the bachelor household to our twoperson household model. We also extend the results to non-homogeneous utility functions. With this aim, let us denote by a(µ) the minimum level of asset holdings for which household income becomes independent of employment shocks. The value ofã(µ) and the proof of Proposition 2 are presented in the Appendix.
Proposition 2: Assume A1 -A3, a > a(µ), w > 0 and (1 + r) > 0. Then:
(b) If β(1 + r) = 1, for any a ≥ a(µ) and any s we have a (s, a; µ) = a, and c f (s, a; µ) + c m (s, a; µ) = a r such that µU 
In the case β(1 + r) < 1, the household can reach any value of asset holdings from any initial condition in finite time, and a stationary distribution arises in the long run. Moreover, in the case β(1 + r) = 1 and a ≤ a(µ), capital accumulation in the long run is bounded and it converges asymptotically to a(µ). This is in contrast to the case of inelastic labor supply where savings asymptotically grow to infinity if β(1 + r) = 1. As it should be apparent from these results, the endogenous labor-leisure decision changes the asymptotic behavior of consumption and wealth by removing income uncertainty. That is, when household wealth is high enough that the restriction (1−τ )w i h i ≥ be i becomes binding for both workers, employment shocks no longer affect household income. Hence, under non-stochastic income, unbounded asset accumulation is no longer optimal when β(1 + r) = 1.
If we set a > max µ∈(0,1) a(µ) and choose initial capital holdings for all households with relative Pareto weight µ such that a 0 (µ) ≤ a(µ), then the upper bound on asset holdings, which was imposed to guarantee existence and uniqueness of the value function, is never binding.
The Steady-State Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium in the two-person household economy where all households have a common Pareto weight µ is defined as follows. Let ψ(B; µ) be a probability measure, defined on the Borel sigma algebra B, describing the mass of households at each B ∈ B. Denote by P (s, a, B; µ) the probability that a household at state (s, a) will transit to a state that lies in B ∈ B in the next period. The transition function P can be constructed as,
where I is an indicator function and B s and B a are the projections of B on S × S and [a, a], respectively. We are now ready to define the stationary equilibrium.
Definition: A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets in the economy with two-person households is a list of functions
measure of households ψ and a set of prices r, w f , w m , tax rate {τ } and UI replacement rate {b} such that:
1) For given prices, tax rate and UI replacement rate, V is the solution to (2.8) -(2.10), and
, h m (s, a; µ) and a (s, a; µ) are the associated optimal policy functions.
2) For given prices, K, L f and L m satisfy the firm's first-order conditions (2.2) -(2.4).
3) Aggregate factor inputs are generated by the policy functions of the agents:
4) The time-invariant stationary distribution ψ is determined by the transition function P as
(2.20)
5) The government budget is balanced:
Under assumptions A1 -A3 the interest rate in the stationary equilibrium must be such that
Parameterization and Calibration
We assume identical preferences for females and males and parameterize their common instantaneous utility function as follows, 6
Since our exercise is on intra-household insurance, and since insurance is tightly connected to wealth, it is important that we match the proportion of low-wealth households in the U.S. Thus, and following ideas in Krusell and Smith (1998), we assume that households are heterogeneous in terms of the discount factor, β. Namely, there is a fraction, say χ, of impatient households with discount factor β L . Patient households use discount factor β H > β L .
The production technology is the standard Cobb-Douglas function, Finally, we have the borrowing limit, a, the Pareto weight, µ, and the fraction of impatient households, χ .
One period is set to one quarter. We choose a = 0 so that households face a no-borrowing constraint. We set σ = 2, which is a standard value in the macro literature. The depreciation rate of capital is set at δ = 0.025, and the capital's share of income, α, equal to 0.36. We pin down the value of λ from a priori information on the gender wage gap. We set λ equal to 0.575, The remaining six parameters, γ, ρ, µ, β H , β L , and χ, are set to match the following six targets: 1) Married working females' average hours of work represent 28% of their discretionary time. 8 2) Married working males' average hours of work represent 40% of their discretionary time (see 7 These transition probabilities are taken from Imrohoroglu (1989) , Krusell and Smith (1998) and Marcet et al.
(2007).
8 Mazzocco et al. (2008) use PSID data and obtain mean annual hours worked by working married females and males equal to 1660 and 2312, respectively. We assume 16 hours of daily discretionary time.
footnote 8). 3) Estimates for males' Frisch elasticity in the presence of borrowing constraints range from 0.2 to 0.6 (see Domeij and Flodén 2006 ). We will target a Frisch elasticity for males of 0.5. 9 It should be noted that this value, along with the first target, imply a Frisch elasticity for females of 0.85, which is in line with empirical estimates (see, e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy 1999).
4)
The capital-to-output ratio is 10. 5) The fraction of liquidity-constrained households in the U.S. (using Zeldes' 1989 definition of liquidity constrained as holding non-housing wealth below two months of average income) averages 17% for the period 1983-2004, as reported by Gorbachev and Dogra (2010). 6) Finally, we target the ratio of wealth held by the bottom quintile in the wealth distribution over total wealth to be less than one percent. Table 1 presents our benchmark economy.
[Insert Table 1 but it does less well at matching the upper tail. We could improve on the upper tail by introducing three different discount factors, as in Krusell and Smith (1998), instead of only two. However, since our focus is on the effects of intra-household risk sharing at the level of the household, and since these effects are small for households with high levels of wealth, it is not crucial that we match the upper part of the wealth distribution. Hence, our model contains the structure needed to conducting the study on intra-household risk sharing.
Policy Functions: A First Look at the Effects of Intra-household Risk Sharing
We start by presenting policy functions in our model economy and then assess the effects of intra-household risk sharing on households' savings and hours worked. The left panel of Figure 1 presents savings policy functions (for convenience we plot the net change in asset holdings a − a), with at least one of the spouses unemployed choose negative net savings at a large set of low asset holdings. Negative net savings are larger in households where the male is unemployed.
Policy functions for hours are shown in the right panel of Figure 1 (top chart for impatient households and bottom chart for patient ones). For both groups, hours decrease with household wealth. As asset holdings approach the borrowing limit, policy functions for hours bend upwards, capturing the fact that asset-poor households use labor supply to smooth consumption more intensively. Hours increase if the spouse is unemployed, both for females and males, and the increase is especially marked for females in asset-poor households. For example, a female in a household with no assets will supply almost half of her available time to work if the spouse is unemployed, as opposed to 0.36 when the spouse is employed, which represents a decline of 28%. The use of savings and labor supply as insurance mechanisms depends on the generosity of public insurance. The extent to which the ability to share risks within the household shapes the crowding out effects of public insurance is explored in this section.
Household Financial Assets and the Generosity of UI
An implication of our model, as of any model with uninsurable income risk, is that household asset holdings increase with income uncertainty. Since the level of UI is directly correlated with household income risk, Engen and Gruber (2001) exploit the variation in generosity of unemployment insurance schedules across U.S. states to test this implication and to estimate the extent of the precautionary savings motive. These authors use SIPP data -which follows a cross section of households over a period of 2.5 years-in combination with data on UI available to these households under their state/date insurance system. They regress household financial assets (normalized by average household income) on the generosity of UI, controlling for a vector of demographic and economic characteristics of the household. They find an elasticity of the average household's assets-to-income ratio with respect to UI equal to −0.28. That is, reducing the replacement rate of UI by 50% would increase the household's assets-to-income ratio by 14%. We use our model economy to compute the elasticity of the average assets-to-income ratio with respect to UI. This exercise serves two purposes. First, we test the ability of our two-person household model to account for this estimated measure of the precautionary savings motive.
Second, we also compute this elasticity in the bachelor household model and then assess the role of within-household risk sharing in shaping the effects of changes in UI on savings. Variation in UI in the bachelor household model amounts to larger changes in household income risk and, consequently, to larger effects on savings.
In order to mimic the empirical exercise conducted by Engen and Gruber (2001) , who rely on the exogenous variation in UI across U.S. states, we proceed as follows. The level of UI in our benchmark economy is interpreted as the average value across all states. Then, in order to embed variation in UI across states, we vary the replacement rate and compute households' assets-toincome ratios holding equilibrium prices unchanged, a strategy in accordance with the existence of a unique financial and labor market across states. Then, we average out these assets-to-income ratios using the long-run distribution of households over asset holdings. However, this long-run distribution is let to change with UI in order to capture that variation in UI across states is permanent, and it has already shaped the distribution of wealth within each state. Thus, our exercise compares the differential asset-to-income ratio of households across states that provide these households with differing levels of UI, which is exactly what Engen and Gruber (2001) do in their empirical work. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 2 . Our two-person household model yields an elasticity of the assets-to-income ratio with respect to UI equal to −0.39, accounting thus fairly well for the elasticity estimated by Engen and Gruber (2001) . On the contrary, the bachelor household model yields an elasticity of 0.70, which is more than twice the estimated value. This shows that intra-household risk sharing plays a crucial role in the determination of the elasticity of the assets-to-income ratio and, therefore, that this source of insurance is key when assessing the crowding out effects of public insurance.
[Insert Table 2 The elasticity of the assets-to-income ratio with respect to UI in the two-person household economy increases only to −0.42 when the correlation in employment shocks is set to 0.3.
Spousal Labor Supply as Insurance
The policy functions shown above suggest that spousal labor supply is a potentially important source of household self-insurance. The change in a household member's labor supply induced by an unemployment spell of another household member -the added worker effect-has been largely studied in the empirical literature. Special attention has been paid to the labor supply response of married women to their husband's unemployment spells. 10 The early literature on the added worker effect (see Cullen and Gruber 2000 for a short review) has singled out liquidity constraints as one of the main reasons married women increase hours worked during their husband's unemployment spells. Empirical estimates have, however, produced mixed results, failing to find strong support for this effect. 11 Cullen and Gruber (2000) , using SIPP data for married couples aged between 25 and 54 years old, report means for wives' monthly hours worked during husbands' spells of employment and unemployment, respectively. Conditional on working women, these authors find that wives of unemployed husbands work a mean of 149 hours per month, as opposed to 132.4 hours by wives of employed husbands. When non-working wives are included, average hours are 98.2 and 97.9, respectively.
We now study the response of female labor supply to males' unemployment spells in our model 10 The main argument in favor of restricting the attention to labor supply of women is that they are the secondary wage earners in most households (according to Cullen and Gruber 2000, in 87% of married couples in the U.S. the husband earns more and in 73% the husband works more hours).
11 Stephens (2002) estimates the added worker effect taking into account not only the current period of the husband's job loss but also the periods before and after a job loss. This author finds small pre-displacement effects but large, persistent post-displacement effects.
economy. In order to highlight the role of liquidity constraints for wives' labor supply responses we look at the group of liquidity-constrained households separately (we follow Zeldes (1989) and define a household as liquidity constrained if its non-housing wealth is less than two months of average income). Table 3 below reports the added worker effect in our model economy. For the group of liquidity-constrained households, average hours worked by wives of unemployed husbands are 8.6% higher than those worked by wives of employed husbands, an increase comparable to that found by Cullen and Gruber (2000) in their sample of working women. When all households are taken into account the increase in hours is only 2.7%. This shows that spousal labor supply is an insurance mechanism used mainly by wealth-poor households, but less so by the wealth rich.
[Insert Table 3 here]
How effective is wives' labor supply as insurance against income fluctuations due to husbands' unemployment? To answer this question we compute, for each level of assets, a, the fraction of lost family income that is made up by the wife's response to the husband's unemployment spell,
where h f (0, 1, a) denotes hours worked by a female with an unemployed husband and h f (1, 1, a) is female hours if the husband is employed. The denominator represents lost income due to husband's unemployment. The numerator is the increase in income due to the wife's response in hours. For the group of liquidity-constrained households, the wives' response makes up about 9.6% of lost family income, while this number is only 2.5% when we consider all households. Again, this shows that wealth-rich households smooth consumption over the husband's unemployment spell using savings. Liquidity-constrained households must rely, however, on female labor supply.
Spousal Labor Supply and the Generosity of UI According to some authors, the moderate to nil added worker effect found in the data may be partially explained by the presence of public insurance. That is, unemployment payments during the husband's unemployment spell crowd out wife's labor supply. Cullen and Gruber (2000) estimate this effect using SIPP data on unemployment experiences of husbands and the concurrent labor supply of their wives, coupled with information on cross-household variation in potential UI. They find that a 50% reduction in potential UI of the husband (75 USD per week) would imply an increase in monthly hours worked by the wife (conditional on working) of 13.42 hours, which amounts to an increase of about 9%.
They also find a differentially larger response of wives' labor supply among liquidity-constrained households.
We use our model economy to compute the crowding-out effects of UI on wives' labor supply. As there is no cross-household variation in UI in our model, to mimic the empirical exercise of Cullen and Gruber (2000) we compute the change in hours worked by the wife of an unemployment husband if their UI replacement rate drops by 50%. To embed the fact that the drop in UI represents cross-household variation and not an economy-wide, permanent drop, we compute the average change in hours worked by the wife using prices and the wealth distribution of our benchmark economy. The 50% reduction in household UI income increases wife's hours of work by 9.87% in the group of liquidity-constrained households. This increase is only 1.92% when all households are considered. The relatively higher sensitivity of spousal labor supply to UI among liquidity-constrained households found in our model in is line with the finding of Cullen and
Gruber (2000).
It should be noted that the Cullen and Gruber (2000) estimated increase in hours of work by the wife after a 50% reduction in UI income received by the unemployed husband is not statistically significant, thus hindering the assessment of our model's predictions.
Consumption Loss Upon Unemployment
Under imperfect capital markets, the loss of the job implies a reduction in the level of individual consumption. The degree of transmission of unemployment shocks to consumption depends on factors such as the generosity of UI, the level of accumulated wealth and on whether or not risks are shared within the household.
In this section we use our benchmark economy to assess the contribution of intra-household risk sharing to individual consumption insurance, as measured by the degree of transmission of unemployment shocks to consumption. We do so by comparing individual consumption losses upon unemployment in the two-person household model to those in the bachelor household model. We compute the percentage change in consumption upon unemployment, c/c, at all asset levels in the support of the corresponding equilibrium distribution. In the two-person household economy, individual consumption losses for females and males, both with an employed spouse and with an unemployed spouse, are computed as, In panel (a) of Table 4 we report average individual consumption losses, both for the group of liquidity-constrained individuals and for all individuals. We use the respective equilibrium asset and employment distributions to average out individual consumption losses. The results
show that intra-household risk sharing provides important consumption smoothing opportunities, especially for liquidity-constrained individuals. Thus, the average consumption loss for a liquidity-constrained female in the bachelor economy is −23.23%, against −4.5% in the two-person household economy. For a liquidity-constrained male, intra-household risk sharing reduces his consumption loss from −30.09% to −8.74%. These numbers imply that the family is an important provider of consumption insurance for a significant fraction of individuals. These results are robust to correlation in employment shocks within the household. For instance, a correlation of 0.3 implies consumption losses in the two-person household economy of −4.85% and −9.05%
for liquidity-constrained females and males, respectively.
[Insert Table 4 here]
We also study household insurance by computing the fraction of household income loss (due to an unemployment shock) that transmits to household consumption loss. To do this we compute income and consumption losses upon an unemployment shock for each household across the asset and employment distributions. Then, we average out the percentage of income loss that is transmitted to consumption loss across all households. Panel (b) of Table 4 [Insert Table 5 here]
It is important to note that the empirical exercise in Browning and Crossley (2001) uses Canadian data, while our baseline parameter values have been chosen to match U.S. stylized facts. Then, rather than trying to account for this elasticity, our exercise in this section aims at shedding further light on the implications of intra-household risk sharing.
Applications and Extensions
The Value of Intra-household Risk Sharing In order to assess the value of intra-household insurance, we first remove from our benchmark economy all intra-household transfers which are not related to risk sharing. This is accomplished by setting the gender wage gap to zero and the relative Pareto weight to one, so that any transfer within the household is driven by risk pooling. We then compute the increase in bachelor consumption that would leave an individual in a two-person household indifferent between remaining in the household and splitting up with half of the household's assets to remain bachelor thereafter. I.e., we compute the value of ζ that solves,
where a superscript tp refers to allocations in the two-person household economy from initial conditions (s i , s j ) and a 0 , and a superscript bach refers to allocations attained by the deviating individual from initial conditions s i and a 0 /2. The results vary widely depending upon own and spouse's employment status, discount factor and asset holdings. For instance, the value of intrahousehold insurance for an impatient, unemployed individual with an employed spouse and no assets represents 5.16% of per period consumption of a similar bachelor individual. This number goes down to 0.75% if the individual is employed. The value of intra-household insurance for the unemployed decreases if the spouse is also unemployed. Also, the value of family insurance is lower to patient than to impatient individuals. When aggregating over employment shocks and discount factors, the welfare gain within the group of liquidity-constrained households averages 0.2387%.
Our model suggests that the value of intra-household insurance is significant to wealth-poor, unemployed individuals and that it decreases with wealth, especially among patient households.
It is worth noting that the value of family insurance to unemployed individuals with no assets is higher than the average value of removing aggregate business cycle fluctuations, as estimated in the literature. Finally, we have also computed the value of remaining in the two-person household without removing first intra-household transfers not associated with risk-sharing (i.e., using the relative Pareto weight and gender wage gap of the baseline economy). In this case, the value of ζ for a male, even if unemployed, changes from positive to negative at relatively low levels of household wealth. Since our model abstracts from public consumption within the household, from children and preferences for marriage, the cost for the male of those transfers not related with risk sharing outweighs the gains from family insurance.
Optimal Unemployment Insurance We carry out two exercises to ascertain how access to insurance from the family shapes the welfare effects of UI, and how it affects the optimal provision of public insurance. First, we compute optimal unemployment benefits in the two-person household and the bachelor household economies. Then, we compute the welfare effects of a 10 percentage points reduction in the replacement rate in both economies. These exercises are carried out following a strategy similar to the one used by Krusell et al. (2010) . That is, ours is a general equilibrium analysis where we compare steady states with different levels of UI, but instead of measuring the welfare effects of UI by comparing ex ante utility across steady states, we compare utilities of moving each household, along with its level of wealth, to a steady state with different UI. We do not condition on the employment status of the household, instead we look at the average household with wealth a when comparing utilities across steady states.
Our results show that insurance provided by the spouse is a key determinant of optimal public insurance. We find that the optimal replacement rate decreases with the level of wealth, both for the two-person and the bachelor household. Also, the differential in optimal replacement rates between these two household arrangements diminishes with wealth. The optimal replacement rate for an average two-person household with no assets is about 15%, while this rate is 60%
for the average bachelor household with no assets, i.e., a difference of 45 percentage points. If
we look now at households with levels of wealth equal to two months of average income, the differential in optimal replacement rates between the two-person and the bachelor household goes down to 30 percentage points. The differential keeps on decreasing up to a level of wealth equal to six months of average income and then vanishes. The reason for a vanishing differential is that optimal UI becomes zero under both household arrangements when a is sufficiently large. On the one hand, wealth reduces the demand for public insurance because households can use their savings to smooth consumption; on the other hand, positive UI implies lower wages as it reduces the aggregate level of capital. These two effects explain why optimal UI goes to zero as wealth increases in both economies.
In our second exercise, we compute the welfare effects (in consumption equivalent units) of reducing the replacement rate by 10 percentage points from the value in our baseline economy. For the average two-person household with no assets this decrease in UI leads to an increase in welfare of 0.015%, while the average bachelor household experiences a decrease in welfare of −0.164%.
Among the group of liquidity-constrained households, the reduction in UI increases welfare of two-person households by 0.034%, and decreases welfare of bachelor households by −0.035%. Lack of commitment within the household implies that savings and labor supply affect both the decision power of husband and wife and the value of divorce, which allows the authors to jointly account for household allocations and marital transitions.
In this paper, we do not solve for intra-household allocations under limited commitment. Instead, we introduce exogenous marital shocks into our benchmark economy and assess its implications for savings and labor supply. It must be noted that this exercise does not embody all the implications of lack of commitment, but it does capture, arguably, the most relevant one, namely, the end of the marriage and hence of insurance from the family.
We follow the work of Cubeddu and and Ríos-Rull (2003) to model some features of the economy with marital shocks. Two-person households are now assumed to face an exogenous probability of dissolution, say φ d > 0. When the separation shock hits, household members become single, each with half of the household assets. We assume no divorce costs. Single individuals face a per period probability, φ m > 0, of being matched with another single of opposite gender. Upon matching, agents share their assets and form a two-person household. While the decision to share assets and form a two-person household is assumed to be exogenous, agents are matched in such a way that relaxing this assumption would not prevent most households from being formed. We restrict matches to be segmented on wealth levels, in the sense that prospective spouses for a single agent with wealth a are assumed to have wealth close to a. When we compute the model, a level of wealth close to a means that it is in the same bin of the grid on asset holdings. 13 We choose φ d so that half of the population lives as married couples (according to the 2001 U.S. census, 54.8%
and 44% of men and women over 25 years of age were married, respectively) and that the average duration of marriage is 7 years. Note that in our dynastic model, if 50 percent of the population lives as married households, we must have that φ d = φ m .
We now assess the effects of risk of divorce on savings, on the extent of the precautionary motive and on consumption losses. The savings effects of marital risk have received some attention in the literature. An important research question in this literature is whether an increase in the risk of marriage dissolution leads to higher household savings. 14 The exercise we conduct in this section consists of computing the change in savings that would follow from the removal of marital risk, both for liquidity-constrained households and for all households in the economy. That is, we start with φ d = 0.024 and compute savings across two-person households. Then we set the probability of divorce to zero and compute savings for these households. We find that savings go down by 4.2584% within the group of liquidity-constrained households, and 0.0292% when all households are considered. The removal of marital risk eliminates a need for precautionary savings and, therefore, decreases households savings. This result is consistent with the findings in González andÖzcan (2008).
We now compute the elasticity of the assets-to-income ratio with respect to UI in this economy with marital risk, which is a measure of the precautionary motive. This elasticity is −0.52, against the −0.39 we found under no marital risk. As expected, the extra risk brought about by marital shocks increases the responsiveness of household asset holdings to changes in UI.
Our final exercise computes consumption losses upon unemployment and/or divorce shocks. That is, we take an agent who is married and employed in period t − 1, and who transits to period t either as: (i) married and unemployed, (ii) single and employed, or (iii) single and unemployed.
We compute the average loss in consumption of this generic agent within the group of liquidityconstrained households. The consumption loss upon the unemployment shock, (i), is −6.42%. The marriage shock, (ii), implies a loss of consumption of −2.13%, and a combined unemployment and marriage shock, (iii), brings about a loss of consumption of −34.32%. In our framework without public goods within the household and without divorce costs, the unemployment shock has larger consumption effects than a marriage shock. The two shocks combined amplify consumption losses.
Three remarks concerning the scope of this version of the model, where married and single households co-exist, are in order. First, as indicated above, under limited commitment one of the participation constraints may bind without implying the breakdown of the marriage, a feature our model is silent about. The agent whose participation constraint binds is likely to be employed.
This agent will see his/her power within the household increase, thus weakening the savings and labor supply effects of intra-household insurance, especially among low-wealth households. Second, if we interpret cohabitation as a form of marriage without family insurance, and assume that singles in our model are cohabiting couples (i.e., two singles under the same roof), then our model accounts for the differential in savings between cohabiting and married couples observed in the 14 See González andÖzcan (2008) for a recent empirical study using the legalization of divorce in Ireland in 1996.
They find results suggesting that the risk of divorce brought about by the law was followed by an increase in the propensity to save of married couples. years old worker will save 15% of his/her income and a 40 years old 20%). Also, life expectancy is known to be higher for married than for single individuals. The increased life expectancy should encourage the married household to save more in order to store up funds for the longer life time of consumption after retirement. Another example of an omitted driver for savings in our model is saving for children's education, an omission that clearly biases downwards the saving rate of married households in our model economy. A final example is savings in health savings accounts, which also contain an important life-cycle component.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we assess quantitatively the effects of intra-household risk sharing on savings and labor supply. With this purpose, we present a model economy where households are formed by a female and a male who face idiosyncratic unemployment risk and lack access to a complete capital market. Our model is a dynamic version of the standard two-person household model developed by Chiappori and co-authors since the 1980's, which assumes efficient risk sharing within the household. Equipped with this model, we explore the quantitative effects of within-household risk sharing on households' savings and labor supplies, on the crowding out effects of public insurance and on consumption losses upon unemployment. In light of our results, we conclude that intrahousehold risk sharing has large quantitative effects on all the margins explored. Importantly, we find that our model economy accounts relatively well for key elasticities of savings and spousal labor supply with respect to UI, as estimated by Engen and Gruber (2001) and Cullen and Gruber (2000) , respectively. We also show that the standard bachelor model of the household fail to match those elasticities. A conclusion we draw from the exercise in this paper is that ignoring risk sharing at the level of the household introduces an important bias not only on the extent of the precautionary motive but also on the distortionary effects of public insurance programs.
The model presented in this paper can be used to address a number of related questions. In and l m (s, a) is increasing in a. From intratemporal optimality (I.2) it follows that c f (s, a) must be decreasing in a and that c m (s, a) must be increasing in a. This is a contradiction with the first-order condition defining risk-sharing rules, i.e., equation (11) in the paper.
(ii) Suppose that l f (s, a) is increasing in a and l m (s, a) is decreasing in a. From intratemporal optimality (I.2) it follows that c f (s, a) must be increasing in a and that c m (s, a) must be decreasing in a. This is a contradiction with (11).
(iii) Suppose that l f (s, a) and l m (s, a) are decreasing in a. From intratemporal optimality (I. 2) it follows that c f (s, a) and c m (s, a) must be decreasing in a. This is a contradiction with (I.3).
Hence, l f (s, a) and l m (s, a) are increasing in a, and (I.3) implies that c f and c m are strictly increasing in a.
(c) As a first step, note from the risk-sharing equation, (11) , that individual consumptions within the household move always in the same direction, so that if the husband consumption increases so does consumption of the wife, and viceversa. We organize the rest of the proof in two cases. 
